Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction

Kriegel, U. (2012). Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(3), 469–486. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.607464

如何处理知行不一belief-behaviour mismatch？作者主张，道德判断有两个分支，其一moral belief负责内在动力，其二moral alief负责外在现象。I argue that moral judgments come in two varieties, moral aliefs and moral beliefs, and it is only the former that are inherently motivating and only the latter that have an objectivistic phenomenology.

S1：提出一个道德心理学问题

Michael Smith提出，目前元伦理学中有三个论点，难以相互调和：

1) Cognitivism认知主义: Moral judgments purport to be about objective matters of fact.

2) Internalism内在主义: Moral judgments are inherently motivational.

3) Humean Psychology休谟心理学: Mental states, including moral judgments, cannot both have objective purport and be inherently motivational. 【前两个命题二选一】

S2：介绍Gendler的alief/belief区分

S3：利用S2的区分，来解决S1的问题

S4：最后探讨本研究的意义：讨论道德思想、道德动机、道德现象学