Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, Volume 22, issue 2, June 2023

Sosa, E. On "Knowledge To" and WANG Yangming. Dao 22, 187–192 (2023).

Drawing on insights of WANG Yangming 王陽明, Yong HUANG proposes an account of a phenomenon that has in recent times suffered neglect. This neglect has been relieved only by the idea of a “besire,” a mental attitude that combines features of both beliefs and desires. I accept the insightfully discerned phenomenon, but offer a different account of its nature and importance. The phenomenon is real, though, and different from the familiar phenomena of knowledge that and knowledge how. 【王阳明的知识论问题，关注一个现象叫besire，指的是兼备信念和欲望的精神态度。】

Schuh, G. Why Does Confucius Think that Virtue Is Good for Oneself?. Dao 22, 193–216 (2023). 

Is being virtuous good not only for others, but also for the virtuous person herself? Call the "yes" answer to this question "the eudaimonistic thesis." In this essay, I argue that the most prominent explanation for why Confucius accepts the eudaimonistic thesis should be rejected; this explanation is that he accepts the thesis because he also accepts "naturalistic perfectionism" or that for something to be good for oneself is for it to realize one's nature and that being a virtuous person realizes human nature. In its place, I propose two alternative explanations: the “hedonistic explanation,” which justifies the eudaimonistic thesis in terms of pleasure, and the "desirability explanation," which provides a justification rooted in the claims that virtuous people function as normative measures and that they desire that they themselves be virtuous. Finally, I discuss what may have motivated later Confucian philosophers to adopt naturalistic perfectionism.

【德性对本人是善好的吗？幸福论者答曰是。主流的孔子解释即采用幸福论，因为孔子接受自然主义的完美主义（善好就是实现其自然本性）。但本文提供两种其他的解释：1，享乐主义；2，可欲性。】

Wong, B. Famine, Affluence, and Confucianism: Reconstructing a Confucian Perspective on Global Distributive Justice. Dao 22, 217–235 (2023).

Recently, most of the discussions in Confucian political theory have concentrated on whether Confucianism is compatible with local political practices, such as liberal democracy. The question of how Confucians view global distributive justice has not yet received critical attention. This essay aims to fill this gap. I will first describe a contractualist methodology, which aims at deriving substantial political principles from a formal conception of the person. Then I will discuss what conception of the person Confucianism assumes. Finally, I will use the contractualist methodology to derive three principles of global distributive justice. These three principles form a distinctive conception based on ideas that are usually ignored in the current discussions of global justice, such as virtues, community, and rituals. 【儒家视角下的全球分配正义问题（政治哲学）。全球正义应该考虑德性、共同体、礼。】

CHONG, Kc. Zhuangzi and the Issue of Human Nature. Dao 22, 237–254 (2023).

[...] Zhuangzi: used different terms equivalent to xing; believed that human nature is bad (despite not mentioning xing); was deliberately silent on xing as an oblique way of criticizing others such as Mencius. I review these claims and provide an analysis of how xing was mainly conceptualized during the Warring States period in essentialist terms. I shall read Zhuangzi's philosophy as transcending this conceptual framework. Instead of a theory of human nature, Zhuangzi provides stories and descriptions of the different facets of human behavior and their psychological and other complexities. These often have an epistemic focus that stand independently of any theory of human nature. 【本文研究《庄子·内篇》中的“性”（人性论），认为庄子也涉及这个问题，只不过是以或同义词或间接地方式论及，庄子认为人性恶，并某种程度上超越了人性论的既有框架。】

Tan, C.A.L. "Freedom In": A Daoist Response to Isaiah Berlin. Dao 22, 255–275 (2023).

In this work, I argue that it may instead be more fruitful to explore the Chinese commentarial tradition for two reasons: (1) the problem of Berlin's liberalist framework is problematic due to its inherently Anglo-European context, and concurrently, (2) there have been rich discussions of the sociopolitical aspects of the Zhuangzi 莊子, especially by its leading Chinese commentator GUO Xiang 郭象, which have not been accounted for. Drawing from GUO Xiang, I render a reading of the concept of “free and easy wandering” (xiaoyao 逍遙) in the Zhuangzi as it directly relates to self-realization (zide 自得) and having no heart-mind (wuxin 無心), which makes for a more holistic understanding of freedom as self-determination. In particular, I argue that freedom in the philosophy of the Zhuangzi can be more aptly understood as “freedom in,” which is more viable and just than both “freedom to” and “freedom from.”【Isaiah Berlin有两个自由概念：freedom to, freedom from。作者借助解读郭象，提出新的自由概念：freedom in。】

【参考】Leung, Yh. ZHU Xi on Emotional Ambivalence. Dao 22, 277–295 (2023).

This article discusses the phenomenon of emotional ambivalence, especially in the moral context. After a nuanced classification of the phenomenon that facilitates accurate evaluation and treatment, it argues that ZHU Xi 朱熹 acknowledges the phenomenon and can provide insights particularly into cases that involve conflicting moral emotions. In light of Zhu, the criterion of motivational harmony rather than motivational unity can more pertinently account for the motivational state of the virtuous persons facing moral emotional ambivalences. This can avoid a certain mystery concerning the status of the nonoptimal emotion and its motivation to action in some of those cases. 【朱熹承认情绪矛盾现象，强调动机的和谐而非统一。】

【重要】Lam, Hk. The State of the Field Report IX*: Contemporary Chinese Studies of Zhuangzian Wang (Forgetting). Dao 22, 297–317 (2023).

The use of the character wang 忘 (forgetting) in the Zhuangzi 莊子 has been widely recognized in traditional and contemporary Chinese scholarship, but its meaning remains unclear. This article reviews some notable studies in Sinophone academia concerning the notion of wang in the Zhuangzi. The studies, though not necessarily focused on wang, shed light on different aspects of the concept, including its relation to self-cultivation, aesthetics, ethics, and ontology. While some scholars see wang as a form of elimination, others stress its relation to other concepts such as shi 適 (fitting). The relation of these two concepts, however, is not yet clear. There are also debates over what makes wang possible, with some linking it to dao 道 and some directing our attention to our daily experience. Despite the limited attention paid to wang to date, the studies reviewed show that it is a crucial aspect of Zhuangzian philosophy and deserves further study. 【研究庄子的“忘”的概念，它也与“适”相关。】【遗忘问题】